Autonomy, Authority, and Answerability

Jurisprudence 2 (1):161-179 (2011)
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Autonomy seems to require that we engage in practical deliberation and come to our own decisions regarding how we will act. Deference to authority, by contrast, seems to require that we suspend deliberation and do what the authority commands precisely because he or she commands it. How, then, could autonomy be compatible with deference to authority? In his critique of Razian instrumentalism, Stephen Darwall lays the groundwork for a distinctively contractualist answer to this question: the normative force of an authoritative directive depends, he argues, on the addressee's free and rational acceptance of the reason addressed to her. But how are we to make sense of free and rational acceptance, when deference to authority requires that one relinquish deliberative discretion? I attempt to resolve this puzzle by outlining a conception of reasonable trust in authority, which, while contractualist in spirit, makes room for a core element of Raz's instrumentalist account



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Andrea Westlund
Florida State University

References found in this work

Authority.Scott Shapiro - 2002 - In Jules L. Coleman & Scott Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law. New York: Oxford University Press.
Authority.Scott Shapiro - 2002 - In Jules Coleman & Scott J. Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law. New York: Oxford University Press UK.
Authority, Accountability, and Preemption.Stephen Darwall - 2011 - Jurisprudence 2 (1):103-119.

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