Authors
Jonathan Westphal
Hampshire College
Abstract
Parts I and II of 'Conflicting Appearances, Necessity and the Irreducibility of Propositions about Colours' review the argument from 'conflicting appearances' for the view that nothing has any one colour. I take further a well-known criticism of the argument made by Austin and Burnyeat. In Part III I undertake the task of positive construction, offering a theory of what it is that all things coloured a particular colour have in common. I end, in Part IV, by arguing that the resulting 'colour phenomenalism', rather than physicalism, is required to give a satisfactory account of the necessity of Wittgenstein's 'puzzle propositions' about colour
Keywords Appearance  Color  Epistemology  Necessity  Proposition  Wittgenstein, Ludwig
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DOI 10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00112.x
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References found in this work BETA

Color Realism and Color Science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
A Simple View of Colour.John Campbell - 1993 - In John J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.), Reality: Representation and Projection. Oxford University Press. pp. 257-268.

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Citations of this work BETA

Color Primitivism.David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):73 - 105.
Color Primitivism.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2006 - In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Erkenntnis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 73 - 105.
What’s That Smell?Clare Batty - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):321-348.
Color.Barry Maund - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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