Does Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science fill a Gap in the Critique of Pure Reason?

Synthese 103 (1):43 - 86 (1995)
In 1792 and 1798 Kant noticed two basic problems with hisMetaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MAdN) which opened a crucial gap in the Critical system as a whole. Why is theMAdN so important? I show that the Analogies of Experience form an integrated proof of transeunt causality. This is central to Kant's answer to Hume. This proof requires explicating the empirical concept of matter as the moveable in space, it requires the specifically metaphysical principle that every physical event has an external cause, and it requires a metaphysical principle regarding the individuation of spatio-temporal things. These three doctrines are not defended in the firstCritique, but only in theMAdN. Kant's transcendental analysis of the conditions of experience thus requires the special metaphysics of theMAdN. This marks an important shift in Kant's view of the metaphysical basis of the transcendental philosophy.
Keywords Michael Friedman  causal judgment  hylozoism
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DOI 10.1007/BF01063718
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Kant and the Exact Sciences.Michael Friedman - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Critique of Judgment.Immanuel Kant - 1790 - Barnes & Noble.
Opus Postumum.Immanuel Kant - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.

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