Is there a modal fallacy in van Inwagen's 'First Formal Argument'?

Analysis 72 (1):36-41 (2012)
Abstract
The argument given by Peter van Inwagen for the second premise on his "First Formal Argument" in An Essay on Free Will is invalid. The second premise hinges on the principle that since a proposition p , some statement about the present, is actually true, ~p can't be true. ~p must be false. What is the reason? The principle is that ~p cannot be true at the same time as p . I argue that, among other things, in its attachment to this sort of principle, van Inwagen's argument commits the most familiar of all the modal scope fallacies
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/analys/anr138
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,813
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Van Inwagen's Modal Skepticism.Peter Hawke - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):351-364.
Van Inwagen on the Cosmological Argument.Anthony Brueckner - 2001 - Philosophical Papers 30 (1):31-40.
Why Free Will Remains a Mystery.Seth Shabo - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):105-125.
9 The Transfer of Nonresponsibility.John Martin Fischer - 2004 - In Joseph K. Campbell (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.
McGrath on Universalism.Michael C. Rea - 1999 - Analysis 59 (3):200–203.
Saying Good-Bye to the Direct Argument the Right Way.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (3):349-383.
Freedom and Miracles.John Martin Fischer - 1988 - Noûs 22 (2):235-252.
Added to PP index
2011-12-03

Total downloads
91 ( #59,252 of 2,202,697 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #301,722 of 2,202,697 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature