‘Must the Transcendental Conditions for the Possibility of Experience be Ideal?’

In C. Ferrini (ed.), Eredità Kantiane (1804–2004): questioni emergenti e problemi irrisolti. Bibliopolis (2004)
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Three genuinely transcendental conditions for the possibility of self-conscious experience are and can only be material (§§2–4). Identifying these conditions shows that the link between transcendental proof and transcendental idealism is not direct, but must be justified by substantive argument (§§ 4, 5). This illuminates the prospect of separating transcendental proofs from transcendental idealism. Indeed, examining these conditions reveals a powerful strategy for using transcendental proof to defend realism sans phrase. Strikingly, this prospect illuminates some otherwise occluded aspects of post-Kantian German Idealism (§6), and sets an important contemporary philosophical agenda (§7).



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Kenneth R. Westphal
Bogazici University

Citations of this work

Contemporary Epistemology: Kant, Hegel, McDowell.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):274–301.
A reconstruction of Kant's ether deduction in übergang 11.Bryan Hall - 2006 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 14 (4):719 – 746.

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