Proportionality, contrast and explanation

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):785-797 (2013)
Abstract
If counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation and if omissions can be causes, then all events have many more causes than common sense tends to recognize. This problem is standardly addressed by appeal to pragmatics. However, Carolina Sartorio [2010] has recently raised what I shall argue is a more interesting problem concerning omissions for counterfactual theories of causation—more interesting because it demands a more subtle pragmatic solution. I discuss the relationship between the idea that causes are proportional to their effects, the idea that causation is contrastive, and the question of the dimensions along which causal explanations should be evaluated with respect to one another.
Keywords Causation  Omissions  Contrast  Explanation  Proportionality  Counterfactuals  Pragmatics
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048402.2013.788045
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,803
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Mental Causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
Contrastive Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains.Neil McDonnell - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):162-170.
The Non‐Occurrence Of Events.Neil McDonnell - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
The Metaphysics of Omissions.Sara Bernstein - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (3):208-218.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Causes as Explanations: A Critique.Jaegwon Kim - 1981 - Theory and Decision 13 (4):293.
Proportionality, Causation, and Exclusion.Thomas D. Bontly - 2005 - Philosophia 32 (1-4):331-348.
Proportionality and Self-Defense.Suzanne Uniacke - 2011 - Law and Philosophy 30 (3):253-272.
The Contrast-Sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):235-245.
Against the Contrastive Account of Singular Causation.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (1):115-143.
Contrastive Explanations as Social Accounts.Kareem Khalifa - 2010 - Social Epistemology 24 (4):263-284.
Against Proportionality.L. Shapiro & E. Sober - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):89-93.
Causation and Contrast Classes.Robert Northcott - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):111 - 123.
Contextualism, Explanation and the Social Sciences.Harold Kincaid - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (3):201 – 218.
Proportionality and Omissions.Phil Dowe - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):446-451.
Added to PP index
2011-11-21

Total downloads
158 ( #30,843 of 2,202,716 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #35,364 of 2,202,716 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature