Abstract
First, on the "lawless adjudicator." The question I want to pose is this: Why is it so hard for the legal academy - and the legal profession - to come to grips with the bare logic of the charge, much less the case, that Vere acted lawlessly, and therefore criminally, and indeed murderously, when he willfully distorted the governing law, so as to execute Billy? Why has this quite specific legal claim not received more of a hearing? Is it because Weisberg was not sufficiently considerate in his communication of this idea? On first blush that seems implausible: It is one thing, after all, to argue syllogistically that Claggart is Christ, that Claggart is a villain, and that therefore Christ is a villain-one can see why that claim may require considerate communication - but the indictment of the fictional Vere in a nineteenth century novella? Why has it proven so hard for the academy to hear Weisberg's claim that Vere is a murderer? Here is the syllogism: Vere was charged with the duty to uphold the law, he betrayed the law and his duty to apply it in order to execute an innocent man, and he did it knowingly, intentionally, and with plenty of malice aforethought, and for the most profoundly personal, political reasons. Therefore, Vere is a lawless adjudicator, a dissembler, a criminal, a murderer. Does that straightforward legal argument - that an adjudicator is a man to whom the power to declare what the law is has been delegated; that an adjudicator might be a criminal, and might achieve criminal ends, through dissembling, misrepresenting, or perverting legal texts, and thereby through breaching a trust - itself require considerate communication? Has our faith in adjudication reached such absurd heights that the lawless or criminal adjudicator has become an unthinkable oxymoron? Or, have our expectations dropped so low that the phrase "lawless adjudicator" has become redundant, so self evident, that the presentation, the claim, that an adjudicator is lawless, is just a trite, banal, and unnecessary restatement of a mode of being always and already present in courts of law?
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,295
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Formal Model of Adjudication Dialogues.Henry Prakken - 2008 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 16 (3):305-328.
Relative Lawlessness in Intuitionistic Analysis.Joan Rand Moschovakis - 1987 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 52 (1):68-88.
More About Relatively Lawless Sequences.Joan Rand Moschovakis - 1994 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (3):813-829.
Spreads or Choice Sequences?H. C. M. De Swart - 1992 - History and Philosophy of Logic 13 (2):203-213.
Robert M. Lawless And.Elizabeth Warren - 2010 - In Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research. Oxford University Press. pp. 198.
Bankruptcy and Insolvency.Robert M. Lawless & Elizabeth Warren - 2010 - In Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research. Oxford University Press.
Negationless Intuitionism.Enrico Martino - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 27 (2):165-177.
Choice Sequences and Informal Rigour.A. S. Troelstra - 1985 - Synthese 62 (2):217 - 227.
Cassiodorus.George P. Lawless - 1981 - Augustinianum 21 (2):445-446.
Augustine: His Life and Thought.George P. Lawless - 1983 - Augustinianum 23 (3):562-563.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-04-08

Total views
17 ( #613,541 of 2,448,702 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #225,345 of 2,448,702 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes