Why is knowledge faster than (true) belief?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Phillips and colleagues convincingly argue that knowledge attribution is a faster, more automatic form of mindreading than belief attribution. However, they do not explain what it is about knowledge attribution that lends it this cognitive advantage. I suggest an explanation of the knowledge-attribution advantage that would also help to distinguish it from belief-based and minimalist alternatives.

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Evan Westra
Purdue University

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