A Case For Negative & General Facts

Swiss Philosophical Preprints (2014)

In this paper I take a closer look at Bertrand Russell's ontology of facts, pro- posed in his 1918 lectures on "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism". Part II is devoted to the question what Russell considered facts to be, and what kinds of facts he assumed. In part III, the controversy over two kinds of facts Russell postulates is described; the opinions of Raphael Demos and Keith Halbasch are considered for this purpose. Following this discussion, part IV investigates the question as to what kind of analysis Russell is conducting that leads him to negative and general facts. Finally, in part V, my conclusions drawn from the combined information of parts II to IV are elaborated; the main claim being, that due to the kind of analysis Russell is conducting, he is not making a mis- take when he assumes negative and general facts.
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