Environmental Values 8 (3):287-323 (1999)

Abstract
This paper addresses the question: Who or what can have a moral status in the sense that we have direct moral duties to them? It argues for a biocentric answer which ascribes inherent moral status value to all individual living organisms. This position must be defended against an anthropocentric position. The argument from marginal cases propounded by Tom Regan and Peter Singer for this purpose is criticised as defective, and a different argument is proposed. The biocentric position developed here is related to that of Albert Schweitzer and Paul F. Taylor, but rejects their assumption of equal inherent value for all living organisms. It argues instead for equal moral status value for moral persons and agents, and gradual moral status value for nonpersons, depending on their degree of similarity with moral persons. Mary Ann Warren's recent book on Moral Status is also discussed. The argument is constructed as a casuistic argument, proceeding by analogical extension from persons to non-persons. The meta-ethical question of its pragmatic validity is discussed
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.3197/096327199129341842
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,289
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Animal Ethics and Interest Conflicts.Elisa Aaltola - 2005 - Ethics and the Environment 10 (1):19-48.
Personhood and Animals.Elisa Aaltola - 2008 - Environmental Ethics 30 (2):175-193.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Moral Status of Post-Persons.Michael Hauskeller - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (2):76-77.
Interested Vegetables, Rational Emotions, and Moral Status.Michael Davis - 1985 - Philosophy Research Archives 11:531-550.
Is Agar Biased Against 'Post-Persons'?Ingmar Persson - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (2):77-78.
Still Unconvinced, but Still Tentative: A Reply to DeGrazia.Allen Buchanan - 2012 - Journal of Medical Ethics 38 (3):140-141.
On the Notion of Moral Status and Personhood in Biomedical Ethics.Azam Golam - 2010 - The Dhaka Univrsity Studies 67 (1):83-96.
Human Enhancement and Supra-Personal Moral Status.Thomas Douglas - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):473-497.
Moral Status as a Matter of Degree?David DeGrazia - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):181-198.
The Moral Status of Artificial Life.Bernard Baertschi - 2012 - Environmental Values 21 (1):5 - 18.
Modal Personhood and Moral Status: A Reply to Kagan's Proposal.David DeGrazia - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1):22-25.
Persons, Post-Persons and Thresholds.James Wilson - 2012 - Journal of Medical Ethics 38 (3):143-144.
Still Afraid of Needy Post-Persons.Nicholas Agar - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (2):81-83.
Mary Anne Warren on “Full” Moral Status.Robert P. Lovering - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):509-30.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-09-29

Total views
226 ( #43,353 of 2,445,004 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #311,040 of 2,445,004 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes