Authors
Allan Gibbard
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
Arrow's Theorem, in its social choice function formulation, assumes that all nonempty finite subsets of the universal set of alternatives is potentially a feasible set. We demonstrate that the axioms in Arrow's Theorem, with weak Pareto strengthened to strong Pareto, are consistent if it is assumed that there is a prespecified alternative which is in every feasible set. We further show that if the collection of feasible sets consists of all subsets of alternatives containing a prespecified list of alternatives and if there are at least three additional alternatives not on this list, replacing nondictatorship by anonymity results in an impossibility theorem
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A Note on Introducing a 'Zero-Line' of Welfare as an Escape-Route From Arrow's Theorem.Christian List - 2001 - Pacific Economic Review (Special Section in Honour of Amartya Sen) 6 (2):223-238.

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