British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):79-100 (2009)
This essay presents results about a deviation from independence measure called focused correlation . This measure explicates the formal relationship between probabilistic dependence of an evidence set and the incremental confirmation of a hypothesis, resolves a basic question underlying Peter Klein and Ted Warfield's ‘truth-conduciveness’ problem for Bayesian coherentism, and provides a qualified rebuttal to Erik Olsson's claim that there is no informative link between correlation and confirmation. The generality of the result is compared to recent programs in Bayesian epistemology that attempt to link correlation and confirmation by utilizing a conditional evidential independence condition. Several properties of focused correlation are also highlighted. Introduction Correlation Measures 2.1 Standard covariance and correlation measures 2.2 The Wayne–Shogenji measure 2.3 Interpreting correlation measures 2.4 Correlation and evidential independence Focused Correlation Conclusion Appendix CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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References found in this work BETA
Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence: A Reply to Andrew Wayne.Wayne C. Myrvold - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (4):661-665.
Citations of this work BETA
New Hope for Shogenji's Coherence Measure.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):125-142.
Coherence and Confirmation Through Causation.Gregory Wheeler & Richard Scheines - 2013 - Mind 122 (485):135-170.
Coherence, Striking Agreement, and Reliability.Michael Schippers - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3661-3684.
Probability and the Explanatory Virtues.Clark Glymour - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):591-604.
Explaining the Limits of Olsson's Impossibility Result.Gregory Wheeler - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):136-150.
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