Focused correlation and confirmation

Abstract
This essay presents results about a deviation from independence measure called focused correlation . This measure explicates the formal relationship between probabilistic dependence of an evidence set and the incremental confirmation of a hypothesis, resolves a basic question underlying Peter Klein and Ted Warfield's ‘truth-conduciveness’ problem for Bayesian coherentism, and provides a qualified rebuttal to Erik Olsson's claim that there is no informative link between correlation and confirmation. The generality of the result is compared to recent programs in Bayesian epistemology that attempt to link correlation and confirmation by utilizing a conditional evidential independence condition. Several properties of focused correlation are also highlighted. Introduction Correlation Measures 2.1 Standard covariance and correlation measures 2.2 The Wayne–Shogenji measure 2.3 Interpreting correlation measures 2.4 Correlation and evidential independence Focused Correlation Conclusion Appendix CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axn048
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References found in this work BETA
What Price Coherence?Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):129 - 132.
Is Coherence Truth Conducive?T. Shogenji - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):338-345.
Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence.Andrew Wayne - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (1):111-121.

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Citations of this work BETA
New Hope for Shogenji's Coherence Measure.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):125-142.
Explaining the Limits of Olsson's Impossibility Result.Gregory Wheeler - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):136-150.
Probability and the Explanatory Virtues.Clark Glymour - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):591-604.

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