Less is More for Bayesians, Too.

In Riccardo Viale (ed.), Routledge Handbook on Bounded Rationality. pp. 471-483 (2020)
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Gregory Wheeler
Frankfurt School Of Finance And Management

Citations of this work

Rational Aversion to Information.Sven Neth - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?David Thorstad - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):396-413.
The accuracy-coherence tradeoff in cognition.David Thorstad - forthcoming - British Journal for Philosophy of Science.
Non-Ideal Decision Theory.Sven Neth - 2023 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley

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