Authors
Ann Whittle
University of Manchester
Abstract
That there is no substance causation is often treated as the default position. My aim in this paper is primarily one of burden shifting: opponents of substance causation must do more to defend their position. After outlining the thesis I wish to defend, I present a simple argument for substance causation, arguing that opponents of substance causation owe us an explanation of why this argument is unsound. I end by answering objections to the view that substances can be causes.
Keywords Substance Causation  Causal Powers  Relata of Causation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/apa.2016.1
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 57,199
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Finkish Dispositions.David K. Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
Construction Area (No Hard Hat Required).Karen Bennett - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):79-104.
Causal Relations.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):691-703.
Contrastive Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.
Three Theses About Dispositions.Elizabeth W. Prior, Robert Pargetter & Frank Jackson - 1982 - American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3):251-257.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Relativity and the Causal Efficacy of Abstract Objects.Tim Juvshik - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (3).
A Critique of Substance Causation.Andrei Buckareff - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1019-1026.
Powerful Substances Because of Powerless Powers.Davis Kuykendall - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (3):339-356.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Leibniz on Causation – Part 1.Julia Jorati - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (6):389-397.
Substance Causation, Powers, and Human Agency.E. J. Lowe - 2013 - In S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe & R. D. Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford Up. pp. 153--172.
How Causal is Downward Causation?Menno Hulswit - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (2):261 - 287.
Mind, Brain, and Free Will.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):255-258.
Personal Agency.E. J. Lowe - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:211-227.
Mental Causation.David Robb & John Heil - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Partial Theory of Actual Causation.Brad Weslake - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Double Prevention and Powers.Stephen Mumford & Rani Lill Anjum - 2009 - Journal of Critical Realism 8 (3):277-293.
The Nonreductivist’s Trouble with Mental Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.). Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-03-10

Total views
128 ( #76,235 of 2,411,827 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #51,994 of 2,411,827 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes