Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):431-446 (2012)

Authors
Bruno Whittle
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Abstract
Here are two plausible ideas about belief. First: beliefs are our means of storing information. Second: if we believe something, then we are willing to use it in reasoning. But in this paper I introduce a puzzle that seems to show that these cannot both be right. The solution, I argue, is a new picture, on which there is a kind of belief for each idea. An account of these two kinds of belief is offered in terms of two components: a relatively stable one, which represents our information; and a more variable one, which represents what we are taking seriously. I also consider the possibility of solving the puzzle by less radical means; and an alternative argument for the proposed account of belief in terms of considerations from desire.
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DOI 10.1111/phpe.12011
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John P. Hawthorn - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
The Scientific Image.C. Van Fraassen Bas - 1980 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Thought.Gilbert H. Harman - 1973 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.

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Uncertainty Without All the Doubt.Aaron Norby - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (1):70-94.

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