Does belief (only) aim at the truth?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300 (2012)

Authors
Daniel Whiting
University of Southampton
Abstract
It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief 's aim explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief 's aim using the notion of truth. In this article, by considering whether they can account for belief 's standard of correctness and the epistemic norms governing belief, I argue against certain prominent specifications of belief 's aim given in terms of truth, and advance a neglected alternative
Keywords aim of belief  truth  evidence  normativity
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01421.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.

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Citations of this work BETA

Can the Aim of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.
To Believe is to Believe True.Howard Sankey - forthcoming - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology.
Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):447-465.
Should Explanations Omit the Details?Darren Bradley - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

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