Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300 (2012)
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| Abstract |
It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief 's aim explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief 's aim using the notion of truth. In this article, by considering whether they can account for belief 's standard of correctness and the epistemic norms governing belief, I argue against certain prominent specifications of belief 's aim given in terms of truth, and advance a neglected alternative
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| Keywords | aim of belief truth evidence normativity |
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| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01421.x |
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References found in this work BETA
The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
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