As an illustration of what Phillips called the "heterogeneity of sense," this essay concentrates on differences in what is meant by a "reason for belief." Sometimes saying that a belief is reasonable simply commends the belief's unquestioned acceptance as a part of what we understand as a sensible outlook. Here the standard picture of justifying truth claims on evidential grounds breaks down; and it also breaks down in cases of fundamental moral and religious disagreement, where the basic beliefs that we hold affect our conception of what counts as a reliable ground of judgment. Phillips accepts the resultant variations in our conceptions of rational judgment as a part of logic, just as Wittgenstein did. All objective means of determining the truth or falsity of an assertion presume some underlying conceptual agreement about what counts as good judgment. This means that the possibility of objective justification is limited. But no pernicious relativism results from this view, for as Wittgenstein said, "After reason comes persuasion." There is, moreover, a non-objective criterion of sorts in the moral and religious requirement that one be able to live with one's commitments. In such cases, good judgment is still possible, but it differs markedly from the standard model of making rational inferences
Keywords D.Z. Phillips  Reasonable belief  Wittgenstein  Persuasion  Grammatical diversity  Rush Rhees  Moral and religious disagreements  Subjective judgment
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DOI 10.1007/s11153-007-9148-3
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Concluding Unscientific Postscript.Søen Kierkegaard & Walter Lowrie - 1941 - Princeton University Press for American-Scandinavian Foundation.
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Wittgenstein and Religion.D. Z. Phillips - 1993 - St. Martin's Press.
Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy.Rush Rhees - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.

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