Philosophers' Imprint 5 (2):1-29 (2005)
It is notoriously difficult to spell out the norms of inductive reasoning in a neat set of rules. I explore the idea that explanatory considerations are the key to sorting out the good inductive inferences from the bad. After defending the crucial explanatory virtue of stability, I apply this approach to a range of inductive inferences, puzzles, and principles such as the Raven and Grue problems, and the significance of varied data and random sampling.
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The Goal of Explanation.Stephen R. Grimm - 2010 - Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 41 (4):337-344.
Evidentialism, Explanationism, and Beliefs About the Future.Kevin McCain - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):99-109.
Can There Be a Bayesian Explanationism? On the Prospects of a Productive Partnership.Frank Cabrera - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1245–1272.
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