Epistemically possible worlds and propositions

Noûs 43 (2):265-285 (2009)
Abstract
Metaphysically possible worlds have many uses. Epistemically possible worlds promise to be similarly useful, especially in connection with propositions and propositional attitudes. However, I argue that there is a serious threat to the natural accounts of epistemically possible worlds, from a version of Russell’s paradox. I contrast this threat with David Kaplan’s problem for metaphysical possible world semantics: Kaplan’s problem can be straightforwardly rebutted, the problems I raise cannot. I argue that although there may be coherent accounts of epistemically possible worlds with fruitful applications, any such an account must fundamentally compromise the basic idea behind epistemic possibility.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00706.x
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Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul A. Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In E. Lepore & B. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.

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