Epistemically possible worlds and propositions
Noûs 43 (2):265-285 (2009)
Abstract
Metaphysically possible worlds have many uses. Epistemically possible worlds promise to be similarly useful, especially in connection with propositions and propositional attitudes. However, I argue that there is a serious threat to the natural accounts of epistemically possible worlds, from a version of Russell’s paradox. I contrast this threat with David Kaplan’s problem for metaphysical possible world semantics: Kaplan’s problem can be straightforwardly rebutted, the problems I raise cannot. I argue that although there may be coherent accounts of epistemically possible worlds with fruitful applications, any such an account must fundamentally compromise the basic idea behind epistemic possibility.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00706.x
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Citations of this work
The nature of epistemic space.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
References found in this work
Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought.Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Oxford University Press UK.