Noûs 43 (2):265-285 (2009)
Metaphysically possible worlds have many uses. Epistemically possible worlds promise to be similarly useful, especially in connection with propositions and propositional attitudes. However, I argue that there is a serious threat to the natural accounts of epistemically possible worlds, from a version of Russell’s paradox. I contrast this threat with David Kaplan’s problem for metaphysical possible world semantics: Kaplan’s problem can be straightforwardly rebutted, the problems I raise cannot. I argue that although there may be coherent accounts of epistemically possible worlds with fruitful applications, any such an account must fundamentally compromise the basic idea behind epistemic possibility.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In E. Lepore & B. Smith (eds.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.
Meaning, Quantification, Necessity: Themes in Philosophical Logic.Martin Davies - 1981 - Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Worlds and Propositions Set Free.Otávio Bueno, Christopher Menzel & Edward N. Zalta - 2013 - Erkenntnis (4):1-24.
Non-Ideal Epistemic Spaces.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2010 - Dissertation, Australian National University
Epistemically Relevant Possible Worlds.Winfried Löffler - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):287-301.
Ramsey's Foundations Extended to Desirabilities.Howard Sobel Jordan - 1998 - Theory and Decision 44 (3):231-278.
What in the World Are the Ways Things Might Have Been? [REVIEW]Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):443 - 453.
Impossible Worlds and Propositions: Against the Parity Thesis.Francesco Berto - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):471-486.
Added to index2009-06-16
Total downloads316 ( #9,130 of 2,158,394 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #46,323 of 2,158,394 )
How can I increase my downloads?