Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence

Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:161-186 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

the symmetry of our evidential situation. If our confidence is best modeled by a standard probability function this means that we are to distribute our subjective probability or credence sharply and evenly over possibilities among which our evidence does not discriminate. Once thought to be the central principle of probabilistic reasoning by great..

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

2010

Other Versions

original White, Roger (2005) "Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence". In Gendler, Tamar Szabó, Hawthorne, John, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, pp. 161-186: Oxford University Press (2005)

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 96,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 161-186.
Evidential Incomparability and the Principle of Indifference.Martin Smith - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):605-616.
On the notion of admissibility in chance-credence principles: A comment on Vranas.Gabriella Pigozzi - manuscript
Belief about Probability.Ray Buchanan & Sinan Dogramaci - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence.David Builes - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):113-127.
How probable is an infinite sequence of heads?Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):173-180.
Evidential Probabilities and Credences.Anna-Maria Asunta Eder - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):1 -23.
How to be indifferent.Sebastian Liu - forthcoming - Noûs.
An empirical approach to symmetry and probability.Jill North - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (1):27-40.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-12-27

Downloads
76 (#229,307)

6 months
30 (#132,370)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Roger White
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.
Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.
Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.

View all 145 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references