Authors
Daniel Whiting
University of Southampton
Abstract
Actions can have, or lack, moral worth. When a person’s action is morally worthy, she not only acts rightly, but does so in a way that reflects well on her and in such a way that she is creditable for doing what is right. In this paper, I develop and defend an analogue of the notion of moral worth that applies to belief, which I call epistemic worth. When a person’s belief is epistemically worthy, she not only believes rightly, but does so in a way that reflects well on her and in such a way that she is creditable for believing what is right. The notion of epistemic worth, I suggest, is of interest to both epistemologists and ethicists.
Keywords moral worth  safety condition  norms of belief  truth  knowledge  safe evidence
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DOI 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0007.003
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Everything is Self-Evident.Steven Diggin - forthcoming - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology.

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