Epistemic Worth

Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Actions can have, or lack, moral worth. When a person’s action is morally worthy, she not only acts rightly, but does so in a way that reflects well on her and in such a way that she is creditable for doing what is right. In this paper, I develop and defend an analogue of the notion of moral worth that applies to belief, which I call epistemic worth. When a person’s belief is epistemically worthy, she not only believes rightly, but does so in a way that reflects well on her and in such a way that she is creditable for believing what is right. The notion of epistemic worth, I suggest, is of interest to both epistemologists and ethicists.

Similar books and articles

Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge.Paulina Sliwa - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):393-418.
Impermissibility and Kantian Moral Worth.Jill Graper Hernandez - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (4):403-419.
The Kantian Moral Worth of Actions Contrary to Duty.Samuel J. Kerstein - 1999 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 53 (4):530 - 552.
XV—The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
On Asymmetry In Kant's Doctrine Of Moral Worth.Jill Hernandez - 2006 - Florida Philosophical Review 6 (1):43-52.
Moral Worth.Nomy Arpaly - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):223.
The Aim of Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.
Moral Worth and Normative Ethics.Arpaly Nomy - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 5.
Moral Hedging and Responding to Reasons.Amelia Hicks - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):765-789.
Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
Does Belief (Only) Aim at the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-09-23

Downloads
238 (#49,930)

6 months
14 (#62,837)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Daniel Whiting
University of Southampton

Citations of this work

Everything is Self-Evident.Steven Diggin - 2021 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 12 (4):413-426.
The Knowledge Norm of Assertion: Keep It Simple.Max Lewis - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12963-12984.
Non-accidental piety: reliable reasoning and modally robust adherence to the divine will.Joona Auvinen - 2022 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 91 (1):43-61.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references