Analysis 50 (1):33-35 (1990)

Villard Alan White
University of Wisconsin, Green Bay
Analysis shows that statements of ability are disguised conditionals. More exactly, the correct analysis of 'X could have done A' is 'If X h decided (chosen, willed ...) to do A, X would have done A'. Therefore having acted freely--having been able to act otherwise than one fact did--is compatible with determinism (with the causal determination of one's acts)
Keywords Compatibilism  Ethics  Free Will  Van Inwagen, P
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DOI 10.1093/analys/50.1.33
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