Knowledge and deductive closure

Synthese 86 (3):409 - 423 (1991)

Authors
Jim White
Cornell College
Abstract
The question whether epistemological concepts are closed under deduction is an important one since many skeptical arguments depend on closure. Such skepticism can be avoided if closure is not true of knowledge (or justification). This response to skepticism is rejected by Peter Klein and others. Klein argues that closure is true, and that far from providing the skeptic with a powerful weapon for undermining our knowledge, it provides a tool for attacking the skeptic directly. This paper examines various arguments in favor of closure and Klein's attempted use of closure to refute skepticism. Such a refutation of skepticism is mistaken. But the closure principle is in any case false, so the skepticism that depends on it is undermined. The appeal of the closure principle derives from a failure to recognize an important feature of our epistemological concepts, namely, their context relativity.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00485268
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 48,955
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Epistemic Operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge.Fred Dretske - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (3):363--378.
Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure.G. C. Stine - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 29 (4):249--261.
Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory.Hilary Kornblith - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (10):597-612.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

An Argument for External World Skepticism From the Appearance/Reality Distinction.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (4):368-383.
Epistemic Contextualism.Antonia Barke - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):353-373.
Contradictory Belief and Epistemic Closure Principles.Bryan Frances - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (2):203–226.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Living Without Closure.Krista Lawlor - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):25-50.
Knowledge-Closure and Inferential Knowledge.Guido Melchior - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):259-285.
Evidentialism and Skeptical Arguments.Dylan Dodd - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):337-352.
Sensitivity, Safety, and Closure.Sven Bernecker - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):367-381.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
99 ( #90,562 of 2,310,343 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #352,812 of 2,310,343 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature