Synthese 193 (6):1615-1633 (2016)

Abstract
In a recent set of publications Ballantyne :485–503, 2011, Synthese 185:319–334, 2012, Synthese 91:1391–1407, 2013) argues that luck does not have a significant role in understanding the concept of knowledge. The problem, Ballantyne argues, lies in what is commonly thought to be a necessary condition for luck—a significance or value condition :385–398, 2007; Lackey, in Austral J Philos 86:255–267, 2008, Ballantyne, in Can J Philos 41:485–503, 2011). For an event, like forming a true belief, to be lucky then it must be of some significance or value to an agent. Yet, if significance, as it has also been commonly thought, plays a role in determining the degree of luck :485–503, 2011), then this leads to a result similar to an absurd form of pragmatic encroachment. If this problem cannot be avoided, then anti-luck epistemology should be abandoned. However, this paper will argue that with proper considerations about the nature of luck according to at least one theory, no such problem arises.
Keywords Luck  Significance  Epistemic value  Epistemic luck  Anti-luck epistemology
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0794-1
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.

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Citations of this work BETA

Luck and Significance.Nathan Ballantyne & Samuel Kampa - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. Routledge. pp. 160-70.
Pritchard Versus Pritchard on Luck.Job De Grefte - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (1-2):3-15.
Knowledge as Justified True Belief.Job de Grefte - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.

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