European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):607-624 (2011)

Authors
Daniel Whiting
University of Southampton
Abstract
Abstract: According to deflationism, grasp of the concept of truth consists in nothing more than a disposition to accept a priori (non-paradoxical) instances of the schema:(DS) It is true that p if and only if p.According to contextualism, the same expression with the same meaning might, on different occasions of use, express different propositions bearing different truth-conditions (where this does not result from indexicality and the like). On this view, what is expressed in an utterance depends in a non-negligible way on the circumstances. Charles Travis claims that contextualism shows that ‘deflationism is a mistake’, that truth is a more substantive notion than deflationism allows. In this paper, I examine Travis's arguments in support of this ‘inflationary’ claim and argue that they are unsuccessful
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00403.x
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Conceptions of Truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Languages, Language-Games, and Forms of Life.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - In H.-J. Glock & J. Hyman (eds.), A Companion to Wittgenstein. Wiley-Blackwell.
On Trying to Leave Truth Alone.David Zapero - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.

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