Episteme 6 (3):233-250 (2009)

Abstract
I treat you as a thermometer when I use your belief states as more or less reliable indicators of the facts. Should I treat myself in a parallel way? Should I think of the outputs of my faculties and yours as like the readings of two thermometers the way a third party would? I explore some of the difficulties in answering these questions. If I am to treat myself as well as others as thermometers in this way, it would appear that I cannot reasonably trust my own convictions over yours unless I have antecedent reason to suppose that I am more likely than you to get things right. I appeal to some probabilistic considerations to suggest that our predicament as thermometers might not actually be as bad as it seems
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DOI 10.3366/e1742360009000689
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.
Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.
Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.
You Just Believe That Because….Roger White - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.
Respecting All the Evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.

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