Philosophical Investigations 38 (1-2):133-149 (2015)

Peter Geach frequently showed the relevance of some of Frege's insights to contemporary philosophical debates, such as that which Geach called “the Frege Point” – “a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same proposition”. Geach argued against a variety of “expressivist” accounts of certain propositions that their proponents could not explain the significance of such propositions in subordinate clauses. The paper extends Geach's argument to show that “the Frege Point” presents a powerful challenge to any attempt, such as those influenced by the later Wittgenstein, to equate meaning with use
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DOI 10.1111/phin.12078
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Assertion.P. T. Geach - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
Logic Matters.P. T. Geach - 1972 - Blackwell.
Review of Wittgenstein On Certainty. [REVIEW]J. E. Llewelyn - 1971 - Philosophical Quarterly 21 (82):80.
Ascriptivism.P. T. Geach - 1960 - Philosophical Review 69 (2):221-225.

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