Singularism

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):371–379 (2003)
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Abstract

I distinguish between two opposing intuitions about the nature of the singular causal relation. The first stresses the nomological character of causation, while the second emphasises is seemingly local character. My question is this: is it possible to formulate an account of causation which incorporates both intuitions? Anscombe gives us reason to think that these intuitions could not be jointly met in an account of causation. Foster and Tooley's acount seems to provide a counter-instance to her claim, but this proves to be a false start. I put forward an alternative suggestion which, by utilising tropes, manages to reconcile both the local and nomological character of causation.

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reprint Whittle, Ann (2003) "Singularism". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103(1):371-380

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References found in this work

Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 2001 - In Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In Lawrence Foster & Joe William Swanson, Experience and Theory. London, England: Humanities Press.
Logical Investigations.Edmund Husserl & J. N. Findlay - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (13):384-398.
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 2003 - In John Heil, Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.

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