The Fourth Account of Conditionals in Sextus Empiricus

History and Philosophy of Logic 7 (1):1-14 (1986)
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Abstract

This paper develops an interpretation of the fourth account of conditionals in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism that conceptually links it with contemporary ?relevance? interpretations of entailment. It is argued that the third account of conditionals, which analyzes the truth of a conditional in terms of the joint impossibility of antecedent and denial of consequent, should not be interpreted in terms of a relative incompatibility of antecedent and denial of consequent because of Stoic acceptance of the truth of some conditionals of the form p ? ?p and its converse. Rather, it is suggested, ancient attempts to avoid the so-called paradoxes of implication involve the fourth account of conditionals. I hypothesize that this account is related to Stoic attempts to define truth conditions for conditionals in terms of a theory of the concludency (validity) of arguments in opposition to the more common procedure (represented by the first three accounts of conditionals) of specifying truth conditions for conditionals ?semantically? and using those truth conditions in the development of a theory of argument validity

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Citations of this work

Sextus Empiricus' Fourth Conditional and Containment Logic.Yale Weiss - 2019 - History and Philosophy of Logic 40 (4):307-322.
Chrysippus’s response to Diodorus’s master argument.Harry A. Ide - 1992 - History and Philosophy of Logic 13 (2):133-148.

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