Theory Pursuit: Between Discovery and Acceptance

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:467 - 483 (1990)
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Abstract

Drawing on diverse historical cases, this paper describes and examines various aspects of a modality of scientific appraisal which has remained largely unexplored, theory pursuit. Specifically, it addresses the following issues: the epistemic and pragmatic commitments involved in theory pursuit, including how these differ from those characteristic of theory acceptance; how the research interests of scientists enter into their pursuit decisions; some of the strategies for the refinement and extension of a theory's empirical abilities which typify theory pursuit; and the need to distinguish between individual and community rationality in contexts of pursuit.

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Citations of this work

Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.
Endorsement and assertion.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):363-384.
How to endorse conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.
Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4947-4973.
Pursuit and inquisitive reasons.Will Fleisher - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 94 (C):17-30.

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