The rights of simulacra: Deleuze and the univocity of being [Book Review]

Continental Philosophy Review 34 (4):437-453 (2001)

Authors
Nathan Widder
Royal Holloway University of London
Abstract
Alain Badiou's recent monograph on Deleuze argues that the latter does not reverse Platonism but instead presents a Platonism of the virtual which appears in his unswerving attention to the univocity of being, and for this reason Deleuze is not truly a thinker of multiplicity but of the One. But this interpretation, which is not unknown in Deleuze literature, rests upon a mistaken conflation of the univocity of being with the Oneness of being. This paper reconstructs the medieval Aristotelian debates around univocity and analogy as they relate to Deleuze's thesis, found primarily in Difference and Repetition, in order to show that Deleuze does indeed reverse Platonism and restore the rights of simulacra and multiplicity.
Keywords Philosophy   Phenomenology   Philosophy of Man   Political Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1013105924798
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 40,683
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Essays on Deleuze.Daniel W. Smith - 2012 - Edinburgh University Press.
Traces of Identity In Deleuze’s Differential Ontology.Gavin Rae - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (1):86-105.
The Role of Mathematics in Deleuze’s Critical Engagement with Hegel.Simon Duffy - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):563 – 582.
The Rise and Fall of the Simulacrum.Charles Mayell - 2014 - Deleuze and Guatarri Studies 8 (4):445-469.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
68 ( #113,093 of 2,242,940 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #625,551 of 2,242,940 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature