Access and the Shirker Problem

American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (3):289-300 (2015)
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Abstract

The Access principle places an epistemic restriction on our obligations. This principle falls prey to the ‘Shirker Problem’, namely that shirkers could evade their obligations by evading certain epistemic circumstances. To block this problem, it has been suggested that shirkers have the obligation to learn their obligations. This solution yields a regress, yet it is controversial what the moral of the regress actually is. The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, I spell out this intricate dispute. Second, on the basis of my analyses I propose solutions to the Shirker Problem.

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Jan Willem Wieland
VU University Amsterdam

Citations of this work

Must We Worry About Epistemic Shirkers?Daniele Bruno - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-26.

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References found in this work

Conceptions of truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The thought: A logical inquiry.Gottlob Frege - 1956 - Mind 65 (259):289-311.
Who Knew?: Responsiblity Without Awareness.George Sher - 2009 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Frege.Michael Dummett - 1975 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):149-188.

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