David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):277-289 (2012)
Pyrrhonism is the view that we should suspend all our beliefs in order to be rational and reach peace of mind. One of the main objections against this view is that it makes action impossible. One cannot suspend all beliefs and act normally at once. Yet, the question is: What is it about actions that they require beliefs? This issue has hardly been clarified in the literature. This is a bad situation, for if the objection fails and it turns out that the Pyrrhonists found a way to secure peace of mind, we better know the details. In the following, I take up this systematic query and show how the objection can be made precise. Despite Sextus Empiricus? ingenious appearance/reality distinction, which is to ensure Pyrrhonism in this, I eventually argue that a life by appearances is quite unlike a normal life
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References found in this work BETA
David Hume (2009). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), The Monist. Oxford University Press. pp. 112.
Julia Annas (1993). The Morality of Happiness. Oxford University Press.
Eric Schwitzgebel (2010). Introspection. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Casey Perin (2010). The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Jan Willem Wieland (2014). Sceptical Rationality. Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):222-238.
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