Logos and Episteme 6 (1):141-146 (2015)

Authors
Erik Wielenberg
DePauw University
Abstract
Juan Comesaña and Carolina Sartorio have recently proposed a diagnosis of what goes wrong in apparently illegitimate cases of ‘bootstrapping’ one’s way toexcessively easy knowledge. They argue that in such cases the bootstrapper bases at least one of her beliefs on evidence that does not evidentially support the proposition believed. I explicate the principle that underlies Comesaña and Sartorio’s diagnosis of such cases and show that their account of what goes wrong in such cases is mistaken.
Keywords easy knowledge  bootstrapping  Juan Comesaña  Carolina Sartorio
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme2015618
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Reliabilism Leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602-623.
Reliabilism Leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Tal and Comesaña on Evidence of Evidence.Luca Moretti - 2016 - The Reasoner 10 (5):38-39.
Basic Knowledge and Easy Understanding.Kelly Becker - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (2):145-161.
Replies to Comesaña and Yablo.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1073-1090.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-01-09

Total views
254 ( #35,820 of 2,432,668 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
40 ( #19,696 of 2,432,668 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes