In Defense of Non-Natural, Non-Theistic Moral Realism

Faith and Philosophy 29 (1):23-41 (2009)
Many believe that objective morality requires a theistic foundation. I maintain that there are sui generis objective ethical facts that do not reduce to natural or supernatural facts. On my view, objective morality does not require an external foundation of any kind. After explaining my view, I defend it against a variety of objections posed by William Wainwright, William Lane Craig, and J. P. Moreland.
Keywords moral realism  Wainwright  Moreland  William Craig  meta-ethics  theism
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DOI 10.5840/faithphil20092612
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PhilPapers Archive Erik Wielenberg, In Defense of Non-Natural, Non-Theistic Moral Realism
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