Infinite Regress Arguments

Acta Analytica 28 (1):95-109 (2013)
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Abstract

Infinite regress arguments play an important role in many distinct philosophical debates. Yet, exactly how they are to be used to demonstrate anything is a matter of serious controversy. In this paper I take up this metaphilosophical debate, and demonstrate how infinite regress arguments can be used for two different purposes: either they can refute a universally quantified proposition (as the Paradox Theory says), or they can demonstrate that a solution never solves a given problem (as the Failure Theory says). In the meantime, I show that Black’s view on infinite regress arguments (1996, this journal) is incomplete, and how his criticism of Passmore can be countered

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2012-06-30

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Jan Willem Wieland
VU University Amsterdam

References found in this work

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
The Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1903 - Cambridge, England: Allen & Unwin.
Zettel.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1967 - Berkeley and Los Angeles: Blackwell.
Zettel.J. E. Llewelyn - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 18 (71):176-177.

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