On the evolutionary debunking of morality

Ethics 120 (3):441-464 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Evolutionary debunkers of morality hold this thesis: If S’s moral belief that P can be given an evolutionary explanation, then S’s moral belief that P is not knowledge. In this paper, I debunk a variety of arguments for this thesis. I first sketch a possible evolutionary explanation for some human moral beliefs. Next, I explain how, given a reliabilist approach to warrant, my account implies that humans possess moral knowledge. Finally, I examine the debunking arguments of Michael Ruse, Sharon Street, and Richard Joyce. I draw on the account of moral knowledge sketched earlier to illustrate how these arguments fail.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,181

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-06-12

Downloads
738 (#10,994)

6 months
16 (#57,731)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Erik Wielenberg
DePauw University

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references