Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):983-997 (2013)

Jan Willem Wieland
VU University Amsterdam
Rationality requires us to have certain propositional attitudes (beliefs, intentions, etc.) given certain other attitudes that we have. Carroll’s Tortoise repeatedly shows up in this discussion. Following up on Brunero (Ethical Theory Moral Pract 8:557–569, 2005), I ask what Carroll-style considerations actually prove. This paper rejects two existing suggestions, and defends a third
Keywords Rationality  Attitude  Obligation  Regress  Carroll  Tortoise
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-012-9397-9
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Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
[Letter From Gilbert Ryle].Gilbert Ryle - 1932 - Philosophy 7 (26):250 -.
What The Tortoise Said To Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 104 (416):691-693.
Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?John Broome - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):321–337.

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