Shifting Concepts: The Philosophy and Psychology of Conceptual Variability

Oxford: Oxford University Press (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Concepts stand at the centre of human cognition. We use concepts in categorizing objects and events in the world, in reasoning and action, and in social interaction. It is therefore not surprising that the study of concepts constitutes a central area of research in philosophy and psychology, yet only recently have the two disciplines developed greater interaction. Recent experiments in psychology that test the role of concepts in categorizing and reasoning have found a great deal of variation, across individuals and cultures, in categorization behaviour. Meanwhile, philosophers of language and mind have investigated the semantic properties of concepts, and how concepts are related to linguistic meaning and linguistic communication. A key motivation behind this was the idea that concepts must be shared across individuals and cultures. With the dawn of experimental philosophy, the proposal that the experimental data from psychology lacks relevance to semantics is increasingly difficult to defend. This volume brings together leading psychologists and philosophers to advance the interdisciplinary debate on the role of concepts in categorizing and reasoning, the relationship between concepts and linguistic meaning and communication, the challenges conceptual variation poses to communication, and the social and political effects of conceptual change.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 79,912

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Amelioration vs. Perversion.Teresa Marques - 2020 - In Teresa Marques & Åsa Wikforss (eds.), Shifting Concepts: The Philosophy and Psychology of Conceptual Variability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Concepts and conceptual change.Paul R. Thagard - 1990 - Synthese 82 (2):255-74.
The Myth of the Common Sense Conception of Color.Zed Adams & Nat Hansen - 2020 - In Asa Maria Wikforss & Teresa Marques (eds.), Shifting Concepts: The Philosophy and Psychology of Conceptual Variability. Oxford University Press. pp. 106-127.
Has psychology debunked conceptual analysis?Per Sandin - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):26–33.
Conceptual atomism rethought.Susan Schneider - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):224-225.
Cybernetic Foundations for Psychology.Bernard C. E. Scott Scott - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):509-517.
Perspectives on Culture and Concepts.Bethany L. Ojalehto & Douglas L. Medin - 2014 - Annual Review of Psychology 66:249-275.
Conceptual and Derivation Systems.Jiří Raclavský & Petr Kuchyňka - 2011 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 20 (1-2):159-174.
Why Concepts Should Not Be Pluralized or Eliminated.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2014 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):7-23.
Conceptual Role Semantics and the Reference of Moral Concepts.Neil Sinclair - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):95-121.
Concepts.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-07-17

Downloads
103 (#129,597)

6 months
8 (#117,928)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Teresa Marques
Universitat de Barcelona

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references