Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism

Philosophy Compass 3 (1):158-181 (2007)
Abstract
Externalism is widely endorsed within contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Despite this, it is far from clear how the externalist thesis should be construed and, indeed, why we should accept it. In this entry I distinguish and examine three central types of externalism: what I call foundational externalism, externalist semantics, and psychological externalism. I suggest that the most plausible version of externalism is not in fact a very radical thesis and does not have any terribly interesting implications for philosophy of mind, whereas the more radical and interesting versions of externalism are quite difficult to support
Keywords semantic externalism  metasemantics  psychological externalism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00107.x
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PhilPapers Archive Åsa Wikforss, Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism
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References found in this work BETA
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Donald Davidson (1987). Knowing One's Own Mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.

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Citations of this work BETA
Herman Cappelen (2013). Nonsense and Illusions of Thought. Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):22-50.
Thomas W. Polger (2009). Identity Theories. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):822-834.

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