Boghossian and Casalegno on Understanding and Inference

Dialectica 66 (2):237-247 (2012)

Authors
Timothy Williamson
Oxford University
Abstract
In response to Paul Boghossian's objections in ‘Inferentialism and the epistemology of logic’, this paper defends counterexamples offered by Paolo Casalegno and the author to an inferentialist account of what it is to understand a logical constant, on which Boghossian had relied in his explanation of our entitlement to reason according to basic logical principles. The importance for understanding is stressed of non-inferential aspects of the use of logical constants. Boghossian's criteria for individuating concepts are also queried
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01295.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):455-464.
The Realm of Reason.Christopher Peacocke - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Blind Reasoning.Paul Boghossian - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):225–248.
New Essays on the A Priori.Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.) - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Paolo Casalegno's Good Points.Elisa Paganini - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (2):215-219.

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