British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (2):131-144 (1980)
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| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/31.2.131 |
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References found in this work BETA
Theory of Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment.Bruno de Finetti - 1970 - New York: John Wiley.
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Citations of this work BETA
Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.
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Conditionalization Does Not Maximize Expected Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1155-1187.
The Application of Constraint Semantics to the Language of Subjective Uncertainty.Eric Swanson - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (2):121-146.
Externalism and Exploitability.Nilanjan Das - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):101-128.
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