Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):385-420 (2008)
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Abstract |
John Hawthorne in a recent paper takes issue with Lewisian accounts of counterfactuals, when relevant laws of nature are chancy. I respond to his arguments on behalf of the Lewisian, and conclude that while some can be rebutted, the case against the original Lewisian account is strong.I develop a neo-Lewisian account of what makes for closeness of worlds. I argue that my revised version avoids Hawthorne’s challenges. I argue that this is closer to the spirit of Lewis’s first (non-chancy) proposal than is Lewis’s own suggested modification
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DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00196.x |
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References found in this work BETA
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
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Citations of this work BETA
Levelling Counterfactual Scepticism.Katie Steele & Alexander Sandgren - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):927-947.
Are Non-Accidental Regularities a Cosmic Coincidence? Revisiting a Central Threat to Humean Laws.Aldo Filomeno - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5205-5227.
Counterfactual Skepticism and Multidimensional Semantics.H. Stefansson - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (5):875-898.
A Probabilistic Semantics for Counterfactuals. Part B.Hannes Leitgeb - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):85-121.
View all 29 citations / Add more citations
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