Cambridge University Press (1995)
AbstractThis book offers the first sustained critique of individualism in psychology, a view that has been the subject of debate between philosophers such as Jerry Fodor and Tyler Burge for many years. The author approaches individualism as an issue in the philosophy of science and by discussing issues such as computationalism and the mind's modularity he opens the subject up for non-philosophers in psychology and computer science. Professor Wilson carefully examines the most influential arguments for individualism and identifies the main metaphysical assumptions underlying them. Since the topic is so central to the philosophy of mind, a discipline generating enormous research and debate at present, the book has implications for a very broad range of philosophical issues including the naturalisation of intentionality, psychophysical supervenience, the nature of mental causation, and the viability of folk psychology
052159734X 9780521597340 9781139174374 0521474027
Similar books and articles
Individualism, Computation, and Perceptual Content.Frances Egan - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):443-59.
Individualism and Evolutionary Psychology (Or: In Defense of "Narrow" Functions).David J. Buller - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):74-95.
Some Problems for Alternative Individualism.Robert A. Wilson - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):671-679.
Methodological Individualism Considered as a Constitutive Principle of Scientific Inquiry.Ron McClamrock - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):343-54.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
A Conceptual and Empirical Framework for the Social Distribution of Cognition: The Case of Memory.Amanda Barnier, John Sutton, Celia Harris & Robert A. Wilson - 2008 - Cognitive Systems Research 9 (1):33-51.
Collective Memory, Group Minds, and the Extended Mind Thesis.Robert A. Wilson - 2005 - Cognitive Processing 6 (4).
Ten Questions Concerning Extended Cognition.Robert A. Wilson - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):19-33.
Genuinely Collective Emotions.Bryce Huebner - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):89-118.
References found in this work
No references found.