Topoi 38 (1):261-261 (2019)

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Jessica M. Wilson
University of Toronto at Scarborough
Abstract
This correction reflects that I forgot to cite Stephan Leuenberger's unpublished work in the paragraph beginning "More promising, perhaps, is the orthodox view ..." in Section 5. The overall argument of Section 5 is a development of an argument I gave in footnote 27 of 'No Work for a Theory of Grounding' (Inquiry, 2014). At issue in the relevant sections of 'No Work...' and 'Grounding-based Formulations...' is whether a proponent of Grounding has resources to accommodate strongly emergent phenomena, where strong emergence is understood as contrasting with physicalism. In 'No Work...', after arguing in the text that an account of strong emergence as involving a failure of full Grounding would not accommodate the live possibility that strongly emergent goings-on might be partially but not completely metaphysically dependent on physical goings on, I considered in note 27 whether strong emergence, again understood as contrasting with physicalism, could be characterized by appeal to a Finean notion of partial Grounding, as the view that strongly emergent goings-on are partially but not fully Grounded in physical goings-on, and I argued that assuming that the notion of partial Grounding was taken to be primitive, then (since there were no prospects of defining full Grounding in terms of primitive partial Grounding along lines of defining a general notion of parthood in terms of primitive proper parthood or identity), such an approach would require that full Grounding also be taken as primitive, with possibly yet another primitive connecting partial and full Grounding. I heard Leuenberger's talk 'Emergence and Failures of Supplementation' in May 2015; for purposes of developing my previous argument (as per Section 5 in 'Grounding-based Formulations...') this talk was helpful since Leuenberger correctly argued that there were also no prospects for implementing the partial Grounding-based strategy by taking full Grounding to be primitive and defining partial Grounding in terms of full Grounding, since that would import a weak supplementation structure that might not be present in cases of strong emergence. I wrote to Leuenberger asking for his slides so that I could reference him and his work (which again is presented in the paragraph beginning "More promising, perhaps, is the orthodox view..."), but somehow forgot to include a citation to his talk, for which I sincerely apologize. One last thing: the erratum is a bit misleading about my use of Leuenberger's work. My discussion of whether a primitivist (i.e., 'non-orthodox') understanding of Finean partial Ground serves as a suitable basis for a partial Grounding-based approach to strong emergence stems from footnote 27 of my 2014, not Leuenberger's 2015 talk, and in both 'No Work...' and 'Grounding-based Formulations...' I argue that such an approach would be problematic, not "suitable", since involving two or three primitives. Also worth noting is that I do not claim or argue that the orthodox conception of partial Grounding as defined in supplementary fashion in terms of full Grounding is *incompatible* with strong emergence. Again, at issue in both 'No Work...' and in 'Grounding-based Formulations...' is strong emergence understood as contrasting with physicalism, so the relevant application of a partial Grounding-based strategy, whether or not involving an 'orthodox' account of partial Grounding as definable in terms of full Grounding, is in my papers one according to which strongly emergent goings-on are partially but not fully Grounded in *physical* goings-on. So far as I can tell, there might be cases of strong emergence that *do* obey supplementation, and which would be compatible with a partial Grounding-based account of strong emergence, where the operative notion of partial Grounding is 'orthodox' (non-primitive). For my purposes, what is important is that cases of strong emergence might not obey supplementation.
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-019-09644-7
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The fundamental: Ungrounded or all-grounding?Stephan Leuenberger - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2647-2669.

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