Centering the Principal Principle
Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1897-1915 (2021)
Abstract
I show that centered propositions—also called de se propositions, and usually modeled as sets of centered worlds—pose a serious problem for various versions of Lewis's Principal Principle. The problem, put roughly, is that in scenarios like Elga's `Sleeping Beauty' case, those principles imply that rational agents ought to have obviously irrational credences. To solve the problem, I propose a centered version of the Principal Principle. My version allows centered propositions to be objectively chancy.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s11098-020-01515-x
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Citations of this work
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Time's arrow and self‐locating probability.Eddy Keming Chen - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
On Imprecise Bayesianism in the Face of an Increasingly Larger Outcome Space.Marc Fischer - 2022 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (4):367-379.
References found in this work
A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
Towards a Best Predictive System Account of Laws of Nature.Chris Dorst - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):877-900.