Egocentric and Encyclopedic Doxastic States in Delusions of Misidentification


Authors
Sam Wilkinson
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
A recent debate in the literature on delusions centers on the question of whether delusions are beliefs or not. In this paper, an overlooked distinction between egocentric and encyclopedic doxastic states is introduced and brought to bear on this debate, in particular with regard to delusions of misidentification. The result is that a more accurate characterization of the delusional subject’s doxastic point of view is made available. The patient has a genuine egocentric belief (“This man is not my father”), but fails to have the commonly attributed encyclopedic belief (“My father has been replaced by an impostor”)
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DOI 10.1007/s13164-012-0125-0
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Nonfactualism About Epistemic Modality.Seth Yalcin - 2011 - In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
The Aim of Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (s16):267-97.

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