Explanatory priority monism

Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1339-1359 (2021)
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Abstract

Explanations are backed by many different relations: causation, grounding, and arguably others too. But why are these different relations capable of backing explanations? In virtue of what are they explanatory? In this paper, I propose and defend a monistic account of explanation-backing relations. On my account, there is a single relation which backs all cases of explanation, and which explains why those other relations are explanation-backing.

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Isaac Wilhelm
National University of Singapore

Citations of this work

Centering the Principal Principle.Isaac Wilhelm - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1897-1915.

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