Functionalism and moral personhood: One view considered

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):521-530 (1984)
Daniel dennett has offered a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being the proper object of our moral commitment, That is, For something's being a person. Strict application of these largely pragmatic conditions, However, Would result in a moral community with quite a surprising membership roster, Because of both who is on it and who isn't. The problem is that "your" being a person should amount to more than a function of "my" goals and cleverness
Keywords Ethics  Functionalism  Morality  Dennett, D
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DOI 10.2307/2107617
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Distinguishing Basic Needs and Fundamental Interests.Fabian Schuppert - 2013 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (1):24-44.

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