Gradational accuracy and nonclassical semantics

Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):513-537 (2012)
Abstract
Joyce (1998) gives an argument for probabilism: the doctrine that rational credences should conform to the axioms of probability. In doing so, he provides a distinctive take on how the normative force of probabilism relates to the injunction to believe what is true. But Joyce presupposes that the truth values of the propositions over which credences are defined are classical. I generalize the core of Joyce’s argument to remove this presupposition. On the same assumptions as Joyce uses, the credences of a rational agent should always be weighted averages of truth value assignments. In the special case where the truth values are classical, the weighted averages of truth value assignments are exactly the probability functions. But in the more general case, probabilistic axioms formulated in terms of classical logic are violated—but we will show that generalized versions of the axioms formulated in terms of non-classical logics are satisfied
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DOI 10.1017/S1755020312000214
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References found in this work BETA
Vagueness, Truth and Logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
General Semantics.David Lewis - 1970 - Synthese 22 (1-2):18--67.

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Citations of this work BETA
Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):897-908.

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